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On February 1, 2010, President of Belarus Aleksandr 
Lukashenka signed the edict No. 60 On Measures 
for the Improvement of Operation of the National 
Segment of the Internet. According to official state-
ments, the edict is to protect interests of citizens, 
the society and the state in the information sphere, 
to raise the quality and cut the costs of Internet 
services as well as to secure further development 
of the national segment of the Internet. The edict 
will come into force on July 1, 2010. Meanwhile, 
some of its provisions, including codification of 
data of the country’s fiber-optic communication 
lines, will take effect on May 1, 2010. By July 1, 
2010 respective state agencies have to prepare 
regulations necessary for the enforcement of the 
norms established by the edict.   
It has to be stressed that till now the operation and 
usage of the World Wide Web was rather poorly 
regulated by the Belarusian law. Suffice to say that 
there was no common standard of spelling the 
word Internet while by the end of 2009 there were 
1,200 pieces of legislation registered in the national 
register of legal acts mentioning Internet as a subject 
of regulation. Legal acts varied in type and nature: 
the Ministry of Communication defined technical 
parameters of providing communication services 
whereas other ministries established procedures of 
using state institutions’ websites to inform citizens, 
the National Statistics Committee, the National 
Bank and the Tax Ministry regulated e-commerce, 
etc. Thus the need for a comprehensive legal regula-
tion was evident.  
It is quite common for the legal system of Belarus 
that legal acts setting foundation for a state regu-
lation in a certain sphere are passed not by the 
Government or the Parliament, but by decisions 
of the President. Previous legislators’ attempts to 
regulate relations in the virtual space have failed. 
For example, the regulation on the operation of 
computer clubs and Internet-cafes passed by the 
Government in 2007 dealt only with particular 
Searches carried out in offices of the independent 
mass media in March as well as means taken by 
the authorities to limit the scope of activities of the 
Belarusian Association of Journalists once again 
evidenced how restricted journalists’ freedoms are 
in Belarus. It is probable that freedom of expression 
will become even more restrained after the new edict 
aimed to regulate provision and use of the national 
segment of the Internet will come into force on July 
1, 2010. Changes in legal regulation brought by the 
edict are analyzed by Yury Chavusau.   
One should not let self be deceived – not only 
particular groups of society challenging authorities 
live in surveillance in Belarus. The enforcement of 
the edict mentioned above will practically mean 
the legality of invasion of privacy of any ordinary 
Belarusian since Internet providers will be obliged to 
store data on rendered Internet services whereas the 
Executive Analytical Centre under the President will 
be endowed with a legal right to supervise the virtual 
space, including the tap of e-correspondence. 
Besides the intensification of the virtual supervision, 
the society in Belarus incurs constant watch-out in 
the real life. Starting from children in kindergartens 
to staff in enterprises – everybody wanting a safe 
and tolerable living has to comply with certain 
rules of behaviour. Pavel Usov in his contribution 
presents a detailed picture of this unceasing sur-
veillance performed by ideological structures and 
educational formations. 
Living in a society ensuring freedom of expression 
makes it hard to imagine how it is to live in per-
manent surveillance. Therefore, this issue aims to 
remind what restrictions Belarusians face in their 
everyday life. Not only it will explain unease and fear 
prevailing in Belarusian society but, more impor-
tantly, make it easier to understand the difficulties 
for civil society formation in Belarus. 
Julija Narkeviciute, Editor
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issues, it became rapidly obsolete, while many of 
the clauses were never put into practice. 
Edict No. 60 is systemic and covers a wide range of 
spheres dealing with the Internet. In particular, it 
regulates e-commerce and e-services provided by 
Belarusian companies and by foreign companies 
based in Belarus as well as protects customers’ rights 
in this sphere. It sets common standards for state 
institutions’ websites, provides for the registration 
of information resources in the national segment 
of WWW as well as contains a number of clauses 
aimed at copyright protection and prevention 
of Internet ‘piracy’. The edict is the first effort to 
ensure access restriction upon consumer request. 
For instance, on user request an Internet provider 
is obliged to restrict access to data containing por-
nography, violence, cruelty and other illegal acts. 
However, independent experts expressed particu-
lar concern regarding new possibilities to restrict 
user privacy set by the edict. For instance, from 
July 1, 2010, in an effort to protect citizens and 
the state, Internet providers will have to identify 
Internet users’ subscriber equipment, keep records 
and store data about it as well as about provided 
Internet services. Procedures of identification of 
Internet users in public access centres and personal 
subscriber equipment, keeping records about such 
equipment, storing personal data of Internet users 
together with rendered Internet services are to be 
defined by the Executive Analytical Centre under 
the President. It seems that previous efforts of the 
authorities to introduce the system of ID-show 
in Internet-cafes and registration of all domains 
visited by the users that failed in 2007 this time 
will be brought to life. 
The edict charges the above mentioned Executive 
Analytical Centre with functions of a single coor-
dination centre of state control and supervision 
in the Internet, including the issues of privacy 
restriction and invasion of privacy. On January 4, 
2010, before the edict No. 60 was passed, President 
Aleksandr Lukashenka signed the law On Changes 
and Amendments to Laws of the Republic of Be-
larus in Order to Tighten Crime Control vesting 
the Executive Analytical Centre with the power to 
perform investigation activities on the territory of 
Belarus. Among other things, the Centre is entitled 
to check e-correspondence of Belarusians and 
monitor actions of Belarusian users in the World 
Wide Web. 
In general, taking the nature of the Belarusian regime 
into account, the edict will not create qualitatively 
new mechanisms of surveillance and supervision 
over Belarusian Internet users. It is rather aimed 
at legalizing methods of invasion of privacy earlier 
used by the authorities without any legal grounds. 
In particular, while putting the regime’s political 
opponents under surveillance, special services used 
various trap-and-trace devices to read personal 
e-mails and keep an eye on users’ behaviour in 
the Internet. For example, during the Presidential 
election campaign in 2006, evidence gathered 
through the Internet surveillance appeared at least 
in two politically-motivated criminal cases. The 
case against the satirical cartoons’ authors, who 
were charged with slander on the head of the state, 
contained tapped e-mails and materials testifying 
involvement of the accused persons in distribu-
tion of the cartoons in the Internet. Evidence of 
similar type was used in the criminal case against 
the members of the NGO Partnership who organ-
ized independent election observation during the 
presidential election in 2006. In general, opponents 
of the regime believe the authorities have been tap-
ping their e-mail and controlling Internet traffic long 
before, just as they have been tapping their phone 
conversations without prosecution warrant.  
Thus the edict is mainly meant to regulate and 
systemize methods of monitoring the World Wide 
Web which theretofore have been used by the au-
thorities. However, it provides for adopting further 
instructions and regulations which might create 
new surveillance mechanisms. In particular, the 
authorities might choose to establish a system of 
subscriber identification similar to the one that is 
functioning in the domain of mobile phone services. 
In this case subscribers would be required to present 
identity cards in order to connect to the Internet. 
Moreover, the edict’s provisions on information 
resources’ registration can in by-laws evolve in such 
a way that even a personal blog would be recognized 
as a website subject to registration.  
However, it has to be realized that the edict has more 
of a symbolic meaning. This is a sign for all state 
bodies and agencies that the country’s leadership 
intends to control information flows in the virtual 
space that earlier used to be relatively unmonitored. 
Till now Internet media and blogs were relatively 
unrestrained information sources. Suffice to say 
that the draft text of the edict appeared in the Net 
as early as December 2009. It was public’ reaction 
to the original version of the edict that prompted 
the authorities to correct a number of the edict’s 
most odious provisions and polish it up a bit by 
‘hiding’ the most provocative wording.  
Evaluating the content of the edict, the commentary 
it is accompanied with as well as public discussions 
among experts, one can come to conclusion that 
the Belarusian Government chose an extremely 
strict model of Internet regulation which potentially 
puts unjustified restrictions on personal privacy. 
However, this strict model is intrinsic to all modern 
trends of Internet freedom restriction, including 
the ones functioning in the West. Therefore, there 
are no grounds to compare the Internet regulation 
in Belarus with that in China, Iran, all the more in 
North Korea or Turkmenistan. The edict rather 
introduces the regulation model similar to the one 
put into practice in Kazakhstan. 
The edict binds respective institutions to work 
out a draft law aimed at determining administra-
tive, criminal and other forms of responsibility for 
violation of the edict No. 60 and other legislative 
acts regulating the usage of the Belarusian segment 
of the Internet by the end of 2010. It means that 
for the time being the state only paid its attention 
to the virtual space. However, it has more serious 
plans for the future.   
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The system of political control is an integral part 
of any undemocratic regime. On the one hand, it 
determines stability and power of the regime by 
disclosing and neutralizing domestic enemies. On 
the other hand, a system of control demonstrates 
the level of regime consolidation and possession 
of sufficient resources necessary to launch control 
mechanisms.  
During the last 10-12 years the Belarusian regime 
has been incrementally encroaching on citizens’ 
freedoms by establishing an effective system of 
political control penetrating the entire public 
sphere. Only private life remains unregulated - an 
individual is within his/her own rights to live up 
outside the ideological framework. Naturally, 
‘individual freedom’ ends where public/political 
activity begins. Any person involved in public 
activities running counter to authorities’ interests 
would immediately get under close surveillance 
and, consequently, the all-round pressure of the 
Belarusian political system.  
Political surveillance and control in Belarus is only 
partially based on state machinery of repression 
comprising the KGB, the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, and the President’s security service. The 
Belarusian regime has built an effective system of 
political surveillance by engaging the citizens into 
it, by making them part of the control apparatus.
In order to reinforce the surveillance system, the 
regime has created a number of pro-governmental 
NGOs meant to politically mobilize the population 
and make the political control easier to conduct. 
Here are the best known pro-governmental NGOs: 
BRSM (Belarusian Patriotic Union of Youth), Belaya 
Rus, Federation of the Trade Unions of Belarus.  
Engagement of public organizations, staff of schools, 
universities and state institutions reinforces the 
network of control and creates a climate of distrust 
and fear. This leads to internal disunity and atomiza-
tion of the society. Having no trust to each other, 
Belarusians are not able to demonstrate solidarity 
or defend each other from Government’s pressure. 
A natural outcome is a considerable drop in public 
activity. People prefer staying away from political or 
public actions ‘unauthorized by the Government’. 
Thus the ultimate goal of the Belarusian regime is to 
build up population’s loyalty even if it is expressed 
in mere silent consent to authorities’ actions. 
Realization of this goal requires establishment of 
comprehensive surveillance mechanisms permeat-
ing the political sphere, including activities of the 
opposition, as well as other spheres of public life 
not directly linked to politics. Education and state-
owned industrial sector are the spheres under the 
highest supervision. 
As for the education system, the state control over 
this sphere is by no means accidental. Youth is the 
most dynamic group of the society and mostly 
inclined to challenge established foundations of 
state and society. In many undemocratic countries 
it was the youth that became a key factor for politi-
cal changes and transformation. Seeking to prevent 
anti-state moods and involvement of young people 
in oppositional movements and organizations, the 
system of education is a network of supervision, 
control and mobilization structures.  
Work instructions for educators point out: ‘Special 
attention has to be paid to the formation of politi-
cal and legal culture among students as well as to 
the development of socially acceptable behaviour 
patterns and social responsibility. Educators must 
improve their work with youth leaders, hold regular 
explanatory and information events’1. 
Government bodies together with administration 
and academic staff of all scholastic institutions have 
to be involved in the above mentioned educational 
activities: ‘Corresponding Government bodies and 
education establishments are to coordinate their 
actions aimed at prevention of unregistered oppo-
sitional and radical organizations’ activities among 
youth, in an effort to prevent involvement of young 
people in illegal and unsocial actions’2. 
The following pro-governmental NGOs function in 
all schools and universities of Belarus: BRPO (Bela-
rusian Pioneer Organization) with a membership of 
490 thousand members and BRSM that musters 526 
thousand members. Their main goal (we are talking 
primarily of BRSM that covers youth aged 16-30) 
is not only to keep students from participation in 
the opposition groups but also to involve them into 
activities of pro-governmental structures.  
In fact, unofficially membership in these organiza-
tions has become obligatory since non-participation 
or refusal to join is perceived as a sign of political 
unreliability. These nonconformists get under close 
attention of school administration which considers 
them as potential opposition members.  
The situation looks even worse in secondary schools 
which are smaller in size making it easy to monitor 
membership in pro-governmental organizations. 
According to directives set for secondary schools, 
over 50% of pupils have to become members of 
the BRSM. Students refusing membership are 
1 Деятельность оппозиционных молодежных 
организаций в Республике Беларусь. МГУ им. 
А.А. Кулешова. 2006– г. Могилев, с – 16.
2 Деятельность оппозиционных молодежных 
организаций в Республике Беларусь. МГУ им. 
А.А. Кулешова. 2006– г. Могилев, с – 16.
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regularly oppressed, threatened to graduate with 
low marks in their diplomas, let alone preventive 
conversations with pupils and meetings with par-
ents. The actions of pro-governmental structures 
combine psychological influence, suppression 
of the own will and obtaining of obedience. It is 
absolutely unnecessary to make a person believe 
in the ideas of the organization. Strict obedience is 
a lot more important. In other words, people can 
think whatever they want, but must do only what 
they are told to. 
Ideology is yet another element of political con-
trol. All state institutions and enterprises, higher 
education establishments and secondary schools 
have ideology divisions. State ideology is meant to 
create a strong effect on people’s consciousness and 
generate the increase of loyalty to the regime. The 
mission is performed by the so-called ‘ideological 
workers’ and ‘propaganda-information groups’ 
that organize regular ‘educational’ work with stu-
dents and workers. Alongside with the ideological 
functions, these workers perform the following 
political tasks: 
collection and analysis of information regard-•	
ing political opinions among students and 
workers; 
preventive conversations with ‘politically unreli-•	
able’ members;
provision of information to the bodies respon-•	
sible for dealing with disloyal groups of popula-
tion (KGB); 
organization and monitoring of election cam-•	
paigns, i.e. securing turn-out and participation 
of students and workers in voting. 
Political control grows stronger due to the practice 
of ‘squealing’ spread both among workers and aca-
demic circles including students and teachers. For 
instance, college teachers are supposed to monitor 
and suppress critical remarks made by the students 
about the socio-economic and political situation in 
Belarus as well as to hold ‘preventive conversations’ 
with such students.  
Administrations of state run institutions react 
rigorously to students’ and workers’ membership 
in oppositional organizations or independent trade 
unions. Such activity is suppressed as incompatible 
with state institutions’ work and leads to dismissal 
or expulsion.     
Thereby, with the help of a wide range of social 
structures the political regime exercises full con-
trol over the most important social spheres and 
attains important long term objectives. First of all, 
surveillance mechanisms form patterns of correct 
behaviour and monitor citizens’ compliance with 
them. Thus ‘detection’ and prevention of dissent 
and opposition activity is guaranteed. Second, a 
far reaching political control apparatus facilitates 
the recruitment of citizens to pro-governmental 
structures as well as takes measures against those 
having independent opinions. 
As the ‘opposition environment’ is infiltrated with 
numerous agents of the regime, the authorities 
and administration of state run structures are well 
informed who of the group members take part in 
opposition activities. Moreover, organizations in op-
position lack competence and responsibility in their 
work with members and volunteers. Functioning 
in rough conditions of strict political control and 
surveillance, oppositional organizations continue 
to act according to the legal norms established by 
the regime. Particularly it concerns registration of 
political parties and NGOs, when the leadership 
submits lists of members to the Ministry of Justice, 
which forwards the information to the KGB. Thus 
political parties expose their members directly to 
the authorities. While they consider the Govern-
ment unlawful, the majority of opposition parties 
and organizations value official registration more 
than security of their members. 
Obviously, in such circumstances we can hardly 
expect people, even those unhappy with the regime, 
to join the parties in opposition. Meanwhile, the op-
position forces are extremely inefficient in rendering 
assistance to those oppressed by the authorities or 
supervisors. In other words, we observe the lack of 
collective solidarity among the opposition. 
The events of the recent years demonstrated high 
efficiency of the system of political surveillance 
and control established in Belarus. The authori-
ties show no intention to abandon the practice of 
suppressing dissent. 
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